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Abstract
This paper studies the industry productivity dynamics in China’s manufacturing sector from
1998 to 2007, and in particular, explores to what extent the privatization of state-owned enter-
prises (SOEs) contributes to the aggregate productivity growth. Our results show that, though
non-SOEs on average are more productive than SOEs, the average productivity growth among
SOEs is greater than that of the privately-owned firms. Industry concentration, taxation, and
the credit market all account for this difference in growth between SOEs and non-SOEs. In
addition, industry productivity growth is mainly attributed to the growth of non-SOEs, entry
of non-SOE firms, and the exit of SOEs. However, non-SOE firms that are transformed directly
from SOEs make a small but negative contribution to industry productivity growth.
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1 Introduction
It is well documented that capital and labor misallocation across firms can be an important
barrier to aggregate productivity growth. Hsieh and Klenow (2009) measure the effects of misallo-
cation by showing that, if the marginal products across firms are equalized, the aggregate industry
total factor productivity would be boosted by 30 to 50 percent in China relative to such gains in
the U.S. In this paper, we study directly how reallocation contributed to the aggregate productivity
growth in China between 1998 and 2007. By reallocation, we mean the firm entry, exit and change
in firm ownership, but we focus more on ownership change. The share of state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) in industry production during this period shrank significantly. In 1998, SOEs employ 49
percent of total workers. By 2007, it dropped to 10 percent. SOEs are in general considered to
have low production efficiency while they often enjoy preferential government policy treatments
(for example, formal credit is more accessible to SOEs than to non-SOEs). Switching from state
ownership to private ownership presumably promotes the aggregate productivity growth.
Studying the impact of ownership change on productivity improves our understanding of the
role of reallocation in aggregate productivity transition and dynamics, which is particularly im-
portant for emerging economies where regulatory and policy distortions can be more severe than
in developed economies. Moreover, if reallocation (e.g., through ownership changes) contributes
significantly to the aggregate productivity growth, once this reallocation process slows down or
approaches an end, the aggregate productivity growth will likely also slow down assuming the rest
of the economy keeps the same pace of the growth.
To study the role of SOE privatization, we use firm-level data on China’s manufacturing during
1998-2007, and estimate the firm production function with one Olley-Pakes approach (Olley and Pakes
(1996)), taking into account the ownership type in production. With the estimated firm-level TFP,
we characterize the productivity dynamics of both SOEs and non-SOEs, and quantify to what ex-
tent the privatization of the state sector contributed to the aggregate productivity growth. Change
in ownership takes two forms. In the first, an SOE is transformed into a non-SOE through increased
private share of the firm equity, though the firm name does not change. In the second and more
common form, an SOE firm exits through acquisition by private owners, after which the firm may
go through restructuring; the firm name also changes. Unfortunately, in the firm-level data we have
access to, we do not observe the second form. When an SOE firm exits from the data set, there
are three possibilities: downsizing (so that the firm is no longer eligible to be surveyed), being shut
down (and capital accordingly being scrapped), and being acquired by private owners. We have
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limited information to identify how the SOE firms exit, except that we observe that they no longer
show in the data sample.
Our main findings are as follows. Not surprisingly, SOEs on average have a lower estimated
TFP than non-SOE firms between 1998 and 2007. SOEs had a lower average labor productivity
(ALP) than non-SOE firms before 2004, since then their ALP exceeded that of non-SOE firms .
SOEs have higher growth rates in both TFP and ALP than non-SOEs. Further, we find that both
employment size and market power contribute to the higher productivity growth of SOEs. High
firm indebtedness can curtail productivity growth, though the impact on SOEs and non-SOEs may
differ.
We also find that industry productivity growth is mainly attributed to the entry of non-SOEs,
the growth of non-SOEs and the exit of SOEs. Contribution from firms that are transformed from
an SOE to a non-SOE type is small and negative. This seemingly counter-intuitive result may be
interpreted in several ways. One is the selection problem, that is, the SOEs that did transform
were originally less productive and they remained less productive even after privatization. Our
statistics suggest that this may form a partial explanation. The result could also arise from the loss
of policy favoring such as government subsidies, which offsets any expected growth from switching
to a non-SOE.
There is a fast growing literature studying the productivity growth in China and the role of
reallocation in this process. Hsieh and Klenow (2009) show that reducing misallocation can signifi-
cantly improve the industry productivity. Brandt et al. (2009) present the first comprehensive facts
regarding productivity growth and they found that net entry accounts for most of the productivity
growth in China.
Our paper is the closest, and complementary, to Brandt et al. (2009). The difference is that
in the present paper we focus on the role of firm ownership changes as a form of reallocation
in the aggregate productivity growth, and in production function estimation we explicitly take
into account ownership types. Further, we provide insights on potential reasons for differences in
productivity growth between SOEs and non-SOEs.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces firm ownership types in China and
offers a brief history of the evolution of ownership. Section 3 develops a simple model of ownership
change and firm dynamics. Section 4 analyzes the productivity growth, focusing on differences
between SOEs and non-SOEs. In Section 5 we decompose the productivity growth, and, Section 6
concludes.
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2 Firm ownership change in China
Before China’s economic reform in 1978, the majority of Chinese firms were SOEs clustered in
big cities. In 1978, SOEs accounted for 78 percent of industrial output, 76 percent of employment
and over 84 percent of physical capital investment.1 The economic reform in 1978 led to an
economy that was progressively more open to free market (Lau, Qian and Roland (2001) and Li
(1997)). The proportion of products traded in the market, which reflects the supply and demand,
increased from zero percent in 1978 to 78 percent in 1995 (OECD (2005)). Meanwhile, new firms
with various non-state ownership types emerged and were permitted to enter industries which were
previously exclusively monopolized by SOEs. In particular, governmental policies were introduced
and enforced to boost foreign ownership, particularly in the special economic zones. SOEs in many
sectors now are faced with increasingly intensive competition from the emerging private firms. By
1995, share of total industrial output by SOEs fell sharply, from 78 percent in 1978 to 34 percent.
Appendix A describes the firm data we us for this paper. Since 1998, China’s manufacturing
industries have experienced further substantial changes in ownership type, characterized by SOE
restructuring and flourishing non-SOEs. There are five types of ownership: state-owned, private-
owned, limited-liability, non-domestic-owned (including foreign firms and firms from Hong Kong,
Macau and Taiwan), collectively-owned, and shareholding corporations (see Figure 1).2 Both SOEs
and collectively-owned firms have decreased over time, and private firms and limited liability com-
panies have been expanding since then. During the period 2000 to 2007, the fraction of SOEs
declined from over 15 to 2 percent, and that of collective firms fell from 42 to 5 percent. Private
firms in the manufacturing sector rose from less than 10 percent in 2000 to over 40 percent by
2007. The fraction of limited liability companies rose from 12 to 27 percent, while the fraction of
non-domestic-owned (including HMT & foreign) firms remained comparatively steady at around
15 percent.
The total number of SOEs fell from over 24 thousand in 1998 to 6 thousand in 2007, almost
one-fourth of its previous size, while the total number of manufacturing firms more than doubled,
rising from around 87 thousand in 1998 to 213 thousand in 2005 (Figure 2). The fraction of SOEs
fell from 28 percent in 1998 to 3 percent in 2007 (Figure 3). Meanwhile, the average age of firms
decreased from 14.4 years in 1998 to 9.7 years in 2007, suggesting that sizable non-SOEs were
entering the manufacturing sector, contributing to the growing population of firms.
1See National Bureau of Statistics (2000).
2Different governmental policies (e.g. taxation) apply to different ownership types.
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The significant decline of SOE firms began with a government-initiated three-year plan to
reform SOEs with poor performance. By 2000, 4,000 large- and medium-size SOEs with poor
performance were restructured or closed; the number of such SOEs dropped from 6,599 in 1997 to
3,463. Meanwhile, 66.5 percent of SOEs improved their performance in 2000, with a 140 percent
increase in profit from the previous year. In addition to the extensive government intervention,
these achievements are attributed to the 360 billion Renminbi (over 10% of GDP in 2000) directly
injected into SOEs by the government from 1997 to 2000, as well as expansionary monetary and
statutory policies such as interest rate cuts, debt-equity swaps, and debt write-offs to reduce SOEs’
excessive debt.3 Overall, the share of SOEs in China’s gross domestic product fell from 77.6 percent
to less than 30 percent during this period, while SOEs still provided about 40 percent of urban
employment.
Figure 4 further explores the fall of SOEs in manufacturing and presents the rate of SOE
survival. Note that survival here refers to a firm remaining an SOE conditional on its stay in the
data. We find that if an SOE remains in the market, it becomes more likely to switch to a non-
SOE during this period. The rate of this likelihood kept on rising from no more than 10 percent
to around 20 percent, though after 2005, this trend disappeared.
Historically, there are deep-rooted differences between SOEs and non-SOEs. Their growth can
not be assumed or supposed to follow the same trend4. Therefore, we focus on two classifications
of ownership type: SOE and non-SOE.
It should be noted that the three years listed below mark key points of great changes in China’s
recent economy.
• 2001: China became a member of World Trade Organization (WTO).5 The country has
experienced rapid growth in export since then.
• 2004: China experienced an investment boom in infrastructure projects, which induced a
rising demand for commodities and other raw materials. The fixed asset investment accounted
for as high as 42 percent of China’s gross domestic product. The high investment level
propelled China’s economy to grow by 10.7 percent in the first nine months of 2004, raising
concerns that the then world’s fourth largest economy was overheating.
3It is estimated that a series of interest rate cuts during 1997-2000 brought down financing costs by 260 billion
RMB for SOE firms.
4Before 1978 when China’s economic reform started, private firms were not permitted in China’s economy. Though
private enterprises emerged after 1978, the debates on different ownership type, especially over the legitimacy of
private-owned remain until the mid-1990s. It was not until late 1990 private firms were widely encouraged and
especially welcomed by the local government.
5See Lardy (2001) and World Trade Organization (2005).
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• 2005: China took a series of temporary measures to cool down its overheated economy,
including tightening the credit supply and restricting industrial land use.6
3 Productivity estimation
The sweeping ownership change of China’s manufacturing firms during 1998-2007 is hard to
ignore. The heavy presence of SOEs in manufacturing is considered a factor contributing to resource
misallocation in existing studies, for example, Hsieh and Klenow (2009). The rapid shrinking of
SOEs in the manufacturing sector is supposed to promote aggregate productivity growth. The main
interest of this paper is to quantify the effect of ownership change on productivity and its growth
pattern. This complements the study conducted by Hsieh and Klenow (2009) on misallocation.
We first estimate the production function, taking into account the ownership change. We
then decompose the productivity growth so as to single out the contribution of the ownership
change. The Olley-Pakes method of estimating production function overcomes two types of biases,
namely, the simultaneity bias and the selection bias. The simultaneity bias arises when labor
input choice is a function of predetermined capital stock. The selection bias arises when the
distribution of total factor productivity is truncated due to the firm exit. Recent studies extended
Olley and Pakes (1996) to improve the estimation, with Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2006) as the
latest. To overcome selection and simultaneity bias in estimating the production function, we first
describe and model the firm’s dynamic problem. Then the estimation equations are derived.
We assume that the ownership type change is exogenous. This assumption is necessary and
reasonable, based on the fact that change in ownership type from private-owned to state-owned is
rare in our data; it is the privatization of SOEs that prevails during this period. This process of
SOE restructuring owes more to governmental policy than to the firm’s choice. Such an ownership
change may have direct effects on productivity and on labor costs. In China, SOEs in general bear a
higher burden of labor costs for two reasons. First, besides wages SOEs generally provide benefits
including housing subsidies, health care, and pension benefits. Secondly, wage setting might be
distorted in state-owned firms. For example, a wage depends more on tenure than on worker
productivity. Hence, switching to a non-SOE type of ownership will reduce employment-related
costs. Other than including an ownership type indicator in our estimation, we do not explicitly
model why the ownership change contributes to productivity growth.
6In China, land is state-owned. Firms heavily rely on land use permission from government.
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3.1 The firm’s Problem
The firm’s production function has the Cobb-Douglas form as follows,
Yit = e
ωit+αjjit+εitK
αk
it L
αl
it , (1)
where Yit is the value added of firm i in period t, jit is the ownership type, ωit denotes TFP, and εit
is the measure error. Let the firm’s value function be V (ωit, jit,Kit) for ownership type j in period
t, where j could be SOE or non-SOE. The physical capital evolves as Kit = (1−δ)Kit−1+Iit−1. The
capital adjustment cost is C(Iit) for firm i. To apply the original Olley-Pakes approach, adjustment
cost is assumed to be convex, which appears inconsistent with the investment lumpiness shown in
the data. In implementing the estimation we use the method by Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer
(2006).
We assume that the unobserved productivity ωit follows the same Markov process for all types
of firms, so it does not have j as a subscript, though the estimated productivity process is still
affected by the presence of ownership type. In later sections we estimate the serial correlation and
dispersion parameters for the productivity processes for SOEs and non-SOEs, respectively.
Let w(ωit, jit) be the compensation function per worker. We assume that the firm-level com-
pensation is determined by three variables: market wage, ownership type, and firm productivity.
The continuation value of type j incumbent firms is given by
V c(ωit, jit,Kit)= max
{Lit,Iit}
Y (ωit, jit,Kit, Lit)−C(Iit)− w(ωit, jit)Lit +
1
1 + rt
EtV (ωit+1, jit+1,Kit+1). (2)
Let the firm exit value be V e(ωit, jit,Kit). The firm’s value in period t is then
V (ωit, jit,Kit) = max(V
c, V e).
The demand for investment in capital is
Iit = I(ωit, jit,Kit). (3)
Its inverse function
ωit = h(jit,Kit, Lit) (4)
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is used to estimate the production function. Olley and Pakes (1996) show the conditions under
which the inverse demand function exists. It requires that investment is a monotonic function
of productivity. Here the extension to the Olley-Pakes method is the additional state variable,
ownership type.
The firm’s exit decision rule is given by
χit =


1, if ωit ≥ ω(jit,Kit)
0, otherwise.
(5)
The inverse investment function and the exit rule are the two equations used to overcome the
simultaneity and selection problems of estimation.
3.2 Production Function Estimation
The firm’s dynamic optimal policy functions guide how ownership type enters the production
function estimation. We apply the extended Olley-Pakes type of estimation to correct for the
simultaneity bias, but not for the selection bias arising from firm exit. Not correcting the selection
bias is mainly due to the lack of good data regarding the firm exit, because a firm disappeared
from the data sample may still exist.7. In addition, the exit decision of one SOE may not arise
from a productivity shock, but rather closely relates to the government policy that leads to the
wide-spread SOE privatization.8
Half of the observations in our sample have an investment rate equal to or lower than 1 per-
cent, suggesting some degree of non-convexity in capital adjustment costs which invalidates the
original Olley-Pakes approach. To overcome this problem, we adopt the Levinsohn-Petrin method
and the method proposed by Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2006) (hereby ACF). We estimate the
production function using value added as output for 28 industries. In the following analysis on
productivity, the ACF estimation results are used. The difference between LP and ACF is that
the latter identifies coefficient for labor in the second step of estimation. It turns out that when
labor choice is made to be dynamic, the estimated coefficient for labor in production function is
much larger in the ACF method than that in the LP method. Details of estimation are described
in Appendix B.
7Due to the sampling rule of the original data that all the SOEs and ”above-scale” non-SOEs are covered, a non-
SOE firm that is no longer observed in the sample could be simply falling below the scale. However, the “above-scale”
rule is not strictly imposed and we still observe sizable ”below-scale” non-SOEs within our sample.
8We also estimate the production function after correcting the selection bias. The predicted probability of survival
for most industries is close to one.
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Table 1: Production function estimation
Industry Labor Capital Ownership
OLS ACF OLS ACF OLS ACF
Average 0.454 0.351 0.423 0.304 -0.942 -0.134
Diary products (13) 0.495 0.330 0.312 0.115 -1.048 -0.098
Food processing (14) 0.533 0.283 0.442 0.233 -1.369 -0.046
Beverage and soft drinks (15) 0.587 0.345 0.463 0.298 -0.964 -0.062
Tobacco (16) 0.465 0.185 0.899 0.326 -0.060 -0.150
Textile (17) 0.467 0.380 0.345 0.230 -0.822 -0.101
Apparel and foot wear (18) 0.568 0.379 0.261 0.218 -0.910 -0.269
Leather products (19) 0.468 0.390 0.329 0.095 -1.166 -0.312
Timber and wood products (20) 0.468 0.294 0.301 0.295 -1.076 -0.286
Furniture (21) 0.590 0.365 0.245 0.322 -1.320 -0.197
Paper (22) 0.428 0.350 0.402 0.348 -0.874 -0.117
Printing and publishing (23) 0.376 0.297 0.603 0.423 -0.841 -0.078
Recreation and sport products (24) 0.512 0.347 0.269 0.289 -0.996 -0.121
Refinery (25) 0.248 0.413 0.621 0.587 -0.496 -0.148
Chemical products (26) 0.335 0.336 0.467 0.339 -0.926 -0.123
Medicine (27) 0.430 0.376 0.550 0.451 -0.793 -0.155
Chemical fibre (28) 0.478 0.298 0.375 0.503 -0.880 -0.089
Rubber (29) 0.435 0.322 0.442 0.272 -0.833 0.006
Plastics (30) 0.419 0.364 0.368 0.395 -1.073 -0.170
Non-metallic mineral products (31) 0.382 0.342 0.384 0.279 -0.791 -0.066
Ferrous metals (32) 0.433 0.400 0.479 0.280 -0.778 -0.160
Metal products (34) 0.398 0.328 0.403 0.300 -0.975 -0.073
General machinery (35) 0.431 0.350 0.433 0.218 -1.027 -0.111
Special machinery (36) 0.488 0.390 0.410 0.188 -1.228 -0.160
Transport equipment (37) 0.555 0.438 0.452 0.340 -1.049 -0.105
Electrical machinery and equipment (39) 0.438 0.362 0.455 0.286 -0.935 -0.124
Communication and electronic equipment (40) 0.484 0.451 0.467 0.382 -1.049 -0.107
Measuring Instruments and office products (41) 0.384 0.361 0.392 0.238 -1.001 -0.095
Artworks (42) 0.427 0.339 0.281 0.269 -1.092 -0.225
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Table 1 gives the parameter estimates of the production function for each industry. The average
share of labor in production is 0.35, and the average share of capital is 0.30. The share of labor
in production is much lower than the similar estimates using the U.S. plant-level data, while the
capital share is higher than that estimated using the U.S. data. This suggests that the production of
Chinese firms are more labor intensive relative to that of the U.S. firms. The estimated production
function exhibits very different scale to returns across industries, with diary product industry
(industry 13) being the lowest at 0.45 and refinery industry (25) being the largest at 0.99. Finally,
a comparison with OLS estimation shows that the ACF estimation effectively corrects the downward
bias of the capital share estimate.
SOEs are less productive than other firms, as suggested by the negative coefficient of ownership
for SOEs. Except the chemical fiber industry (28), the estimated coefficients of the ownership type
dummy for industries are all negative. The average estimate is -0.13, suggesting that SOEs are 13
percent less productive than other firms holding other variables the same across ownership types.
3.3 Is the ownership change endogenous?
In the estimation of production function, we assume that the ownership change from SOE to
non-SOE is exogenous, and determined by the government policy. However, government, as the
owner of SOE firms, may behave like a private owner and scrape SOE firms with poor produc-
tivity performance. In this section, we conduct a simple Logit estimation on the probability of
transforming from SOE to non-SOE and on the probability of exit by SOE firms. Table 10 gives
the probability of an SOE being transformed to a non-SOE or exit the market, compared to re-
maining SOE. It shows that the probability of transforming the SOE to non-SOE is larger for
more productive SOEs, and that of exiting is larger for less productive firms. This suggests that
the privatization of SOEs is strongly driven by policy under which the government privatize the
productive SOEs other than productivity itself.
4 Productivity Growth
With the estimated production functions, we obtain the TFP measure for each firm. We assume
that the firm’s productivity shock follows AR(1) process, ωit = γxt+ρωit−1+εit, where xt includes
a constant and the year dummy. The average (over all industries) of the estimated serial correlation
(ρ) is 0.75, and the standard deviation of ωit is 1.30. The productivity shock is fairly persistent
with the serial correlation ranging from 0.54 to 0.95, while the dispersion is large.
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In this section, we examine the heterogeneity of productivity processes across industries, fo-
cusing on the differential between SOEs and other ownership types. The aggregate manufacturing
TFP grows by 24 percent from 1998 to 2007. The average annual growth rate is close to 2.7 percent.
Table 2: Productivity differentials between SOEs and non-SOE firms
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
ωnon−SOE
ωSOE
1.06 1.06 1.06 1.03 1.01 0.99 0.98 0.96 0.96 0.95
ALPnon−SOE
ALPSOE
1.18 1.16 1.16 1.11 1.06 1.04 1.01 0.98 0.97 0.96
The estimated TFP ωit differs significantly between SOEs and other firms, as shown in Table
2. The table shows the ratio of weighted average TFP values for SOEs and non-SOEs. Non-SOE
firms are 6 percent more productive than SOEs between 1998 and 2000, and this positive gap
narrows since then. By 2007, SOEs become more productive than other firms by 5 percent. This
may reflect that the low productive SOEs either exited or were privatized between 1998 and 2007,
as shown in Figure 14 and 18. The shrunken productivity gap between SOEs and other types
are due to the faster productivity growth by SOEs during these years, on average catching up
the non-SOEs, especially private ones. Figure 7 shows the TFP growth for SOEs and non-SOEs,
normalized by the average SOEs TFP. It should be noted that when calculating TFP for firms, we
have already removed the negative contribution of SOE-type presented in the production function.
The aggregate TFP changes with ownership even ownership type is already in production function.
This is mainly because the estimated coefficient for the ownership dummy variable captures only
the average partial difference between the two ownership type. Moreover, differences in the trend
of productivity by ownership is only captured in the estimated TFP.
The similar trend is observed when we use average labor productivity (ALP) to measure pro-
ductivity as shown in Figure 15. Moreover, the gap in ALP growth is even larger, as seen in Figure
8. The plotted labor productivity values are already normalized by the average labor productivity
of SOEs. In 1998, non-SOE firms are 18 percent more productive than SOEs, by 2007 the SOEs
are 4 percent more productive than non-SOE firms.
The differential productivity growth is attributable to mainly the deepening reform on SOEs
including employee lay-offs (Yearbook (2006)) and capital restructuring (Jefferson et al. (1999)).
This change is also closely related to government policies which are to be in details discussed in
later sections. The ownership change between SOE and other types plays a negative but minor role
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in the aggregate productivity growth.
Figure 14 shows the differences of TFP distribution between the SOEs and other firms, as well
as over time. It is clear from the plots that the TFP of SOEs tends to converge to that of non-SOEs.
The difference between the two ownership types becomes smaller in 2007, while the SOEs are still
less productive and with fatter left tails.
4.1 Why Do SOEs outgrow non-SOEs?
The firm-level TFP summarizes all factors other than capital and employment in affecting
production capacity of the firms. In this section, in addition to size, we examine three possible
factors that can benefit the state-owned sector: competition, sales tax, and firm borrowing. These
factors may arise from preferential policies toward the state-owned sector, such as market power,
government subsidies, financing condition, etc.
Industry concentration
One hypothesis is that the market power of the state-owned firms may grow faster in TFP
because of growing market power (See Sutton (1998) and Klepper and Graddy (1990)). We measure
the market power with the industry concentration, that is, the Herfindahl index. The market
power is calculated by summing up the squared market shares of top 10 percent firms. To measure
the industry concentration due to the state-owned firms, we calculate the SOE Herfindahl index,
measured as the sum of squared market shares of the state-owned firms among the top 10 percent
firms. Figure 9 shows that on average the industry concentration in manufacturing decreases over
time. The declining share of SOE firms in total sales is consistent with the shrinking number of
state-owned firms and their falling role in the manufacturing sector.
Tax
Another potential candidate is tax, though its impact could be complicated. On the one hand,
to promote the fast growth of SOEs, the government may subsidize these firms to make them more
competitive. Meanwhile, as the fundamental form of China’s economy, the SOEs have historically
carried large share of government expenditures via corporate income tax (Wong and Shue (2007)).
Figure 11 shows the tax per unit of firm income keeps increasing for the state-owned firms, which
may negatively contribute to productivity growth.Thus the impact of tax depends on which side
of effect dominates. The average tax ratios of both state-owned firms and other firms. Clearly,
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the non-SOEs have been paying much higher tax than SOEs. On average, between 1999-2007, the
state-owned firms paid 25 percent less tax than the private firms per unit of sales (income). This
gap narrowed only in 2007. The impact of such tax advantage on productivity growth of SOEs
could be huge. If tax is taken into account, the state-owned firms would even be less productive
than the private firms.
Debt
In China, the biggest eleven banks are all state-owned and their state-owned shares of assets are
as high as 95.5 percent. These state-owned banks dominate the credit market. In 1999, the big-four
state-owned banks9 accounted for over 77 percent of loans. By 2007, the 99 percent of mid-cap
and small-cap non-SOEs took no more than 33 percent of bank loans. The state-owned firms have
advantage in getting financed10. This potential credit misallocation strongly relates to government
policy. It can be distortionary in that compared to SOEs, the private firms are in general smaller,
and those small and median entrepreneurial firms are more likely to be credit constrained. Figure
12 shows two interesting things. First, the ratio of debt over asset for private firms is on average
only half of that for state-owned firms, with slightly narrower gap in recent years. Secondly, the
debt-asset ratio has been declining for both types of ownership. However, the lower debt-asset
ratio for private firms does not suggest that the growth rate of productivity for private firms is
lower than state-owned firms. Entry of private firms is significant and it’s an important component
of industry growth. The lower debt-asset ratio is more likely to be outcomes of limited access to
credit. Such credit constraint11 on small- and mid-cap private firms suggests that the government
credit policy may hinder productivity growth of private firms.
Our estimation shows that state-owned firms are on average less productive than those non-SOE
firms, though state-owned firms grow faster. The factors that may affect this outcome, however,
remains unclear. To shed light on this, we conduct a regression of one firm’s TFP growth on its firm
size, industry concentration–Herfindahl index, indebtedness, and tax payment. Table 3 shows the
9They refer to bank of China (BOC), Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), China Construction
Bank (CCB) and Agricultural Bank of China (ABC).
10Historically, SOEs have been contributing to majority of government tax revenue; meanwhile, state-owned banks
used to subsidize SOEs heavily via the administrative methods. After economic reform in 1978, these administrative
methods were gradually replaced by bank loans, which from many aspects inherit the similar tasks. The state-owned
firms could obtain bank loans for some reasons, not necessarily because they are more productive.
11Until 2007, private firms are not allowed to issue corporate bonds to raise capital and finance their growth. This
combined with the poorly-developed stock market in China makes financial options narrow to bank loans and internal
fiance, though underground financing is getting common for many small and median private entrepreneurial firms
(see Qi (1991)).
13
regression results. It is a reduced-form regression, thus the causality effect will not be discussed.
Table 3: Factors Affecting TFP growth
Variable Coefficient Std. Err.
SOE -0.311 0.0142
Employment -0.008 0.0011
Employment*SOE 0.038 0.0023
Herfindahl Index -9.045 0.5324
SOE Herfindahl Index 4.500 0.8077
Tax/Sales 1.012 0.1059
Debt/Asset -0.052 0.0079
Tax/Sales*SOE -0.175 0.3240∗
Debt/Asset*SOE 0.019 0.0176∗
Note: Coefficients that are starred are statistically insignificant.
First, we use employment to measure the firm size. The coefficients of firm size is negative
at -.008 for non-SOEs, and positive at .03 for SOEs. That means, among non-SOEs, the larger
firms have slightly lower productivity growth. For SOEs, the productivity growth increases with
employment size.
Secondly, we look at the impact of competition. The coefficient for industry concentration
index is negative at -9.045. The negative index suggests that, the more decentralized the industry
is, the higher productivity growth is. The coefficient for SOE industry concentration is positive at
4.5, suggesting that if the state-owned firms have more market shares among the top 20 percent
firms, the corresponding productivity growth is higher. This is consistent with the hypothesis that
state-owned firms enjoy market power while they dominate the market.
Third, tax sales ratio may reflect potential differences of effective tax rates by ownership. The
regression shows that firms that pay higher income tax per unit of sales have larger productivity
growth than those with lower tax sales ratio. However, the state-owned firms paying higher tax
per unit of sales grow even faster, though statistically insignificant. As we mentioned earlier, the
impact of debt and tax on productivity growth may be causal. Due to the causality effect that
SOEs on average have lower tax ratio than non-SOEs, this result only shows the cross term of SOE
and tax ratio does not contribute in explaining the growth gap between SOEs and non-SOEs.
Fourth, for non-SOE firms, productivity growth is negatively correlated with the debt-asset
ratio. A higher debt-asset ratio indicates slower growth. For SOEs a higher debt-asset ratio,
however, indicates faster productivity growth. Given the available information, it remains unclear
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whether and via what channel debt-asset ratio affects the productivity growth. Without further
and more structural analysis, it is difficult to speculate the underlining correlation between credit
market and productivity growth.
In summary, faster productivity growth of SOEs relative to that of non-SOEs is positively
correlated with size and industry concentration. Firms with higher indebtedness tend to grow
slower, and this observation remains for both SOEs and non-SOEs.
5 Decomposing productivity growth
With the estimated productivity, we now decompose productivity growth into components ac-
counting for contributions from within the firm, between the firm, and reallocation terms (entry/exit
and ownership change). In order to examine to what extent the privatization of SOE firms has con-
tributed to the productivity growth, we also decompose the productivity growth by the ownership
type.
Two important methods of decomposition are the one in Baily, Hulten and Campbell (1992)
and its extension in Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (2002). Given our interest of quantifying the
contribution from ownership changes, we extend the method by Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan
(2002) to allow for ownership changes. Let Pt be the TFP or labor productivity measure of the
entire manufacturing in period t, and pjt be the productivity of firm j. The aggregated industry
productivity is Pt =
∑
j sjtpjt, where sjt is the share of employment of firm j. Let ∆pjt = pjt−pjt−1,
let C1t be firms that did not change ownership between period t − 1 and t, C
2
t be firms that did
change ownership. Also let ENt be the entrants in period t and EXt be the firms exited in period
t − 1. The aggregate industry-level productivity is decomposed into three components: within
ownership, ownership change, and entry/exit, as follows,12
∆Pt =
∑
j∈C1t
(sjtpjt − sjt−1pjt−1) +
∑
j∈C2t
(sjtpjt − sjt−1pjt−1) +
∑
j∈ENt
sjtpjt −
∑
j∈EXt
sjt−1pjt−1. (6)
The first term is the productivity growth accounted by firms that did not experience ownership
changes. The second term captures the contribution through ownership change. The last two terms
are respectively entry and exit. Within each component, we separate the contribution by SOEs
from that by non-SOEs. Table 4 shows the decomposition for TFP.13
12Lentz and Mortensen (2008) also decompose productivity growth by firm types. They take into account the role
of innovative firms in aggregate productivity growth, but in their data there is no switch of firm types.
13To remind, Chinese government cooled down the economy with tightening policies in 2005, we observe that the
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The contribution from the SOE transforming to the non-SOE type contributed negatively to the
total productivity growth. This is counter-intuitive, since the SOEs on average are less productive
than non-SOEs, the transformation is expected to improve performance and promote productivity.
However, we find that the private firms transformed from previous SOEs have lower productivity
growth than the firms born as private.
The other contribution of SOE transformation is through the exit. The last two columns of
Table 4 show that the exiting SOEs are in general less productive than exited non-SOEs, suggesting
that the SOE exiting helps improve the aggregate productivity.
Lastly, the net entry dominates all other components in the aggregate productivity growth,
which confirms the findings by Brandt et al. (2009). The industry productivity is mainly driven by
the entry of non-SOE firms and exit of SOE firms.
We further decompose the TFP growth for C1t firms into the within, between and cross terms,
as in Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (2002) and given by
∆Pt,C1t =
∑
j
sjt−1∆pjt +
∑
j
pjt−1∆sjt +
∑
j
∆sjt∆pjt. (7)
Table 5 shows decomposition. For non-SOE firms both the firm growth and the reallocation between
non-SOE firms are driving the productivity growth, but for SOEs the firm growth dominates.
Similar to the previous studies using the U.S. data, we also find that the cross-firm effect of growth
is small, relative to within effect and reallocation.
The decomposition of ALP displays a similar picture as delivered by the TFP decomposition,
see Table 11. The main sources of labor productivity growth come from the growth of non-SOE
firms, the entry of non-SOE firms, and the exit of SOEs. The net contribution of SOEs to labor
productivity, through within effect, transforming, entry and exit, is negative. The decomposition
within an ownership is shown in Table 12, which exhibits very similar results as the TFP case.
In summary, the growth of productivity at the industry level arises mostly from the expansion
of non-SOEs and the exiting of SOE firms. Transforming an SOE firm to non-SOE firm without
changing the firm production does not increase the productivity.
productivity growth is negative in 2005.
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Table 4: Manufacturing TFP Growth Decomposition, 1998-2007
Within ownership Cross ownership Entry Exit
Year Total Growth Non-SOEs SOEs SOE→Non-SOE Non-SOE→SOE SOE Non-SOE SOE Non-SOE
1999 -0.019 -0.081 -0.198 -0.009 0.004 0.059 0.176 0.000 0.000
2000 0.094 0.164 0.053 -0.006 0.002 0.026 0.163 0.066 0.104
2001 0.150 0.013 -0.144 -0.018 -0.002 0.037 0.310 0.064 0.137
2002 0.146 0.107 -0.081 -0.009 0.001 0.021 0.249 0.046 0.112
2003 0.152 0.066 -0.079 -0.011 0.000 0.022 0.324 0.045 0.112
2004 0.213 0.692 0.058 0.009 0.006 0.025 0.648 0.072 0.240
2005 -0.026 -0.920 -0.219 -0.028 -0.012 0.019 0.303 0.023 0.088
2006 0.124 -0.030 -0.034 -0.009 0.000 0.011 0.267 0.021 0.106
2007 0.194 0.499 0.037 0.005 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.117
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Table 5: TFP growth decomposition within ownership type, 1998-2007
Non-SOEs SOEs
Year Within Between Cross Within Between Cross
1999 -0.011 -0.060 -0.010 -0.013 -0.180 -0.005
2000 0.034 0.142 -0.011 0.024 0.037 -0.008
2001 0.023 0.005 -0.015 0.022 -0.153 -0.013
2002 0.056 0.056 -0.005 0.029 -0.105 -0.005
2003 0.077 -0.006 -0.005 0.022 -0.097 -0.004
2004 0.116 0.577 -0.001 0.021 0.040 -0.003
2005 0.037 -0.932 -0.024 0.007 -0.222 -0.004
2006 0.112 -0.133 -0.008 0.007 -0.040 -0.001
2007 0.127 0.371 0.002 0.011 0.026 0.000
5.1 Negative Growth in Productivity of SOE transformation
In our decomposition, a counter-intuitive but interesting observation is that, the transformation
from SOEs to non-SOEs contributes negatively to productivity growth in China. In order to further
understand the role of ownership type transformation, Table 6 shows the average growth of both
TFP and ALP for SOEs before and after their transformation to non-SOEs. After becoming non-
SOE, both TFP and ALP growth became slower.
On the one hand, it may be because the process of ownership change takes time to affect growth
or it may disturb the production. On the other hand, in the process or privatization SOEs may
survive either because they are highly productive or because the government prefers to maintain
their market power in certain industries; the transformed SOEs could be simply poor-performed
ones. This is consistent with the observation shown in Table 6 that the transformed SOEs had
slower TFP growth than the industry average for all the SOEs before ownership change occurred,
and not surprisingly, after transformation their TFP growth was slower than the average non-SOEs.
We find that those transformed firms are large in employment size. They are 6 percent larger
than the average SOEs, with the ratio (in employment) being 1.06. After ownership change, these
firms downsize by 78 percent in employment, though their employment is still twice the size of
an average non-SOE firm. Apparently, employment downsizing did not make these firms grow
faster. In addition, the firm’s debt burden can potentially cause slower growth through financial
constraint. We find that before the ownership change, the debt-asset ratio for transformed SOEs is
only slightly lower than the average SOEs, while transformed SOEs are much less productive than
industry average for SOEs. After the ownership change, their debt-asset ratio declines slightly but
stays high, roughly twice the size of the average non-SOEs. It remains to be investigated on why
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the transformed SOE firms experience slower productivity growth, which is beyond this paper.
Table 6: Productivity growth before and after SOE becoming non-SOE
TFP ALP
Year Before After Before After
1999 0.047 0.075 0.289 0.003
2000 0.060 -0.002 0.018 0.010
2001 0.017 -0.008 0.027 0.000
2002 0.020 0.000 -0.006 0.035
2003 0.023 -0.008 0.186 0.047
2004 0.015 0.031 0.079 0.052
2005 0.000 -0.009 0.001 -0.006
2006 0.004 0.012 0.006 0.002
2007 - 0.024 - 0.044
Average 0.023 0.013 0.075 0.021
Industry Average SOE non-SOE SOE non-SOE
0.034 0.020 0.060 0.036
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have estimated the productivity of China’s manufacturing firms and decom-
posed its growth in 1998-2007. We find that SOEs on average exhibit a lower level of productivity
but higher productivity growth, relative to other ownership types. The exit of SOEs is one of
the main sources of productivity growth at the industry level. Finally, the non-SOE firms trans-
formed directly from the state-owned type have a small and negative contribution to the industry
productivity growth.
Our findings contribute to the understanding of the role of reallocation in aggregate productivity.
The ownership of SOE represents the unique feature of industry structure in emerging economies as
China. Our findings shed lights on the consequences of more general government policies towards
a particular group of firms through protection or preferential credit policy.
So far, our approach to quantifying the role of reallocation (more specifically ownership trans-
formation) in the aggregate productivity growth is still reduced form. We did not identify the
sources of misallocation and their quantitative importance. Further research is needed to quantify
with more structural methods how the ownership transformation improved productivity. One such
exploration could be to look into the labor adjustment in transition. Cooper et al. (2010) have
demonstrated that labor reallocation and labor market frictions are important in better under-
19
standing the aggregate productivity growth.
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Appendices
A Firm data
The firm data sample we use comes from the annual survey conducted by the National Bureau of
Statistics of China, covering all industrial firms during the period 1998-2007 that are identified either
as SOEs or non-SOEs with annual sales value above 5 million RMB. Industries in the original data
include mining, manufacturing and public utilities. This paper focuses on only the manufacturing
sector. According to the 2004 national industry survey, though covering only 21.5 percent of all
firms, firms in our sample account for over 70 percent employment, 89.97 percent sales value, 89.83
percent output, 87.14 percent capital and 97.74 percent export in China’s manufacturing sector.
Over this period sizable firms experienced restructuring, merger and acquisition, and may
change their identity numbers due to the change of ownership. We use information, such as firm
name, address, telephone number, fax number, and zip code, to track a firm over time. We keep as
many observations as possible, but exclude firms with broken history. During this period, China’s
manufacturing sector experienced a large volume of entry and exit. Our final sample is an unbal-
anced firm-level panel between 1998 and 2007 with over 100,000 firms in each year. Table 7 lists
variable in the data.
Table 7: Available Variables on Firm Heterogeneity
Variable Definition
Output real output of any manufacturing firm within the sample
Industrial value-added real value added
Total employment log(number of employees in a firm)
Wage log (total compensation/(number of employees))
Capital stock log of physical capital
Investment investment in physical capital
Credit constraints the ratio of a firm’s interest expenditures that is used as a proxy for its
capability to borrow over its total debts
Tax the ratio of the firm’s income tax over its annual sales
Ownership Type:
State-owned if registration type is claimed to be state-owned, or be limited liability
corporations or shareholding corporations with over 50% of the regis-
tered assets being state-owned14
Collective if registration type is claimed to be collective, or be limited liability cor-
porations or shareholding corporations with over 50% of the registered
assets being from the collective source
Private if registration type is claimed to be private, or be limited liability cor-
porations or shareholding corporations with over 50% of the registered
assets being private-owned
HMT if registration type is claimed to be Hong-Kong, Macau and Taiwan
Foreign if registration type is claimed to be other than Mainland China, Hong-
Kong, Macau and Taiwan
15
23
A.1 Summary Statistics
Industry classification
The industry classification of a firm follows a 4-digit Chinese Industry Classification (CIC) system
that resembles the old U.S. SIC system. Our sample covers 29 manufacturing industries (by taking
first two digits of 4-digit CIC code), including food processing, textile, refinery, plastics, electronic
equipment and so on. Further details on industries is available in Table 1. The setting of the
classification system in the original data was revised in 2003 to incorporate more detail for some
sectors, while some other sectors were merged. To make the industry code consistent over the
period, we constructed a unified set of classification as did in Brandt, Biesebroeck and Zhang
(2009).
Real output and industrial value added
We use China’s Producer Price Index (PPI) at the CIC 2-digit level as the deflator to convert data
from nominal to real terms. Not surprisingly, shown in Figure 6, the aggregate real output increased
from 4,460 billion RMB in 1998 to 25,200 billion in 2007. And industrial value-added increased
from 1,210 billion RMB in 1998 to 6,640 in 2007. Both measures rose over fivefold over the past
decade. Though increase in prices could reflect increases in quality, the magnitude of increases is
sizable.
Ownership type
A firm claims its registration type annually. Using such information we classify the ownership of
one firm into five basic groups: state-owned (SOEs), collectively-owned, private-owned, HMT (from
Hong-Kong, Macau, and Taiwan) and foreign (from the rest of the world except mainland China
and HMT). Meanwhile, additional information on the composition of a firm’s registered capital is
used to classify those firms that claim themselves as limited liability companies and shareholding
corporations16 to be state-owned, collective or private. In particular, one firm is termed as SOE if its
registration type is claimed to be state-owned, or to be limited liability companies or shareholding
corporations but with over 50 percent of its registered assets being owned by the state. Ownership
change hereafter refers to the change in ownership type.
Capital
We follow Brandt etal (2009) and use the perpetual method to obtain the real value of capital
16Mostly such firms are reconstructed from previous state-owned enterprises or collective firms. The changes in
ownership type occur by means of management buy-out (MBO), previous management raising capital to form a
new firm, shareholdings by previous employees, external finance such as getting public and/or private equity, and
reporting bankrupt and turning private.
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stock.
Figure 16 and 17 show the smoothed firm size distribution measured using both employment
and capital, respectively. Relative to 1998, the firm size distribution shifted leftward, suggesting
smaller average size due to the substantial entry during this period. The distribution of SOEs
apparently displays larger dispersion and smaller skewness than that of non-SOEs.
Capital investment exhibits significant lumpiness with at least half of the firms investment as
low as 1 percent of capital, while the investment rate among the top 10 percentile of firms is as
high as 40 percent. The coexistence of extremely low and extremely high investment rates has
not changed during this period. On average, the investment rates of SOE firms are lower than
Non-SOEs.
Table 8: Investment in 1999 and 2006
1999 2006
All SOE non-SOE All SOE Non-SOE
Mean 13.1% 8.2% 14.8% 16.5% 9.7% 16.7%
Median 1.6% 1.0% 2.2% 2.2% 1.0% 2.4%
Employment and real wage
A firm reports its total annual employment and several components of employee compensation
including total annual wages, total employee supplementary benefits, and total unemployment in-
surance17. Total wage here is termed as the sum of the above three classifications of compensations.
The real term of firm-level average wage is calculated by dividing total deflated wage of one firm
over its total number of employees within. Note that since our sample covers all the SOEs and
those ”above-scale” non-SOEs for the manufacturing sector, the deflator we use not only deflates
across time but approximates the representative wage at the aggregate level18. As shown in Figure
6, employment of manufacturing sector keeps on rising, from less than 35 million workers in 1998
to over 46 million in 2004. This increase in manufacturing employment is mostly due to the rise of
non-SOEs, both numerically and proportionally, as well as their increasing demand for labor force.
We will further discuss this issues on section of change in ownership type. After 2004, the rising
trend flats out and the total employment fell but remains over 20 million, which is also closely
17Most SOEs may further provide information on their expenditures/payment on employees’ total housing subsidy,
medical care and pension plan.
18From NBS website we obtain the average wage payment within the whole economy and this sampling deflator is
calculated by dividing the average annual aggregate wage compensation in our sample over that in the whole economy.
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related to the growing pace of non-SOEs.
Productivity
Besides labor productivity, we also measure productivity in total factor productivity (TFP), which
is derived from four-digit industry-specific production function. During 1998-2007, China’s manu-
facturing industries experienced rapid growth both in output and total factor productivity. If gross
output production function is estimated, the average TFP growth in manufacturing sector is 2.6
percent. As is shown in Section 3, TFP is obtained by estimating the firm’s production function,
but we explicitly include the ownership type, and in particular, consider the privatization of SOEs.
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Table 9: Summary Statistics
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
No. of firms 87,145 99,345 112,212 121,906 129,750 146,008 186,457 213,721 205,255 191,633
Firm Age 14.44 14.41 14.09 12.41 11.67 10.55 8.40 8.24 9.00 9.72
Capital Stock 2.57 3.53 3.90 4.13 4.19 4.55 5.15 6.10 6.45 6.79
Investment 981 439 462 464 571 701 1,040 1,122 1,190 691
Value Added 1.21 1.44 1.71 1.97 2.37 3.03 4.28 4.92 5.78 6.64
Output 4.46 5.24 6.34 7.33 8.67 11.3 11.5 18.5 21.8 25.2
Employment 34.5 36.1 37.2 37.6 38.5 41.7 46.1 52.6 52.3 51.7
No. of SOE 24,091 25,728 25,285 21,119 17,514 14,213 11,293 9,816 8,272 6,125
Percentage SOE 0.28 0.26 0.23 0.17 0.13 0.10 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03
SOE Surv. Rat. 0.95 0.92 0.90 0.91 0.87 0.81 0.88 0.85 0.87
ALP (labor productivity) 3.15 3.26 3.41 3.46 3.60 3.74 4.15 3.98 4.18 4.33
Note: Employment is in the unit of million, capital stock, value-added and output are thousand billion renminbi (RMB), and
investment is billion RMB.
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B Production function estimation
Let the production function of firm i with ownership j be
Yit = e
ωit+αjjit+εitK
αk
it L
αl
it , (8)
where Yit is the value added of firm i in perdiod t, jit is the ownership type, and εit is the measure
error. The ownership type affects the firm’s total factor productivity. Potentially, the ownership
change may improve the efficiency of capital and labor, but it is difficult to identify this efficiency
if we assume that the capital, labor and intermediate input shares in production is the same
across different ownership types. Moreover, ownership can affect productivity that arises from
competition. For example, the state-owned firms may be able to dominate a particular market
designated by the government, switching to non-SOE ownership can lose such a market power.
We start with the well-known estimation procedures of Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003). Then we also discuss Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2006).19
In natural logarithm form, the firm’s production function can be written as
yit = α0 + αllit + αkkit + αjjit + ωit + εit. (9)
Notice that ownership is now an input factor. The state variables in period t is capital stock kit,
ownership jit, and productivity shock ωit. Firm’s ownership type jit in period t is given, hence
behaving as a state variable like the capital. Though the labor choice is partly determined by
ownership, it is a static choice, hence labor is not a state variable.
Following Olley and Pakes (1996), the estimation can be done in three steps. In step one,
inverse the investment demand function and estimate αl with nonparametric function. In step two,
we estimate αk and αj .
In the first step, we inverse the investment policy function, and plug the inverse function into
production function as follows
yit = αllit + φ(jit, iit, kit) + εit, (10)
where φ(jit, iit, kit) = h(jit, iit, kit) +α0 +αkkit +αjjit, φt is a high-order polynomial in jit, kit and
19 See Doraszelski and Jaumandreu (2008) for endogenous productivity arising from R & D, and Amiti and Konings
(2007) for applications to trade liberalization. See ? for adjustment cost and production estimation.
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iit.
The second step is to estimate αk and αj from the following
yit − αllit = α0 + αkkit + αjjit + ωit + εit, (11)
where αl and ωit are estimated in the first step. Note, in obtaining the estimated ωit, its Markovian
property is needed, so that we can write
ωit = g(ωit−1) + ξit
with ωit−1 = φit−1 − α0 − αkkit−1 − αjjit−1.
The second step estimation equation becomes
yit − αllit = αkkit + αjjit + g(ωit−1) + ξit + εit, (12)
We can estimate this equation with NLLS, using a high-order polynomial of φit−1, kit−1, jit−1 for
function g(·).
As Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2006) noted, the step one and step two can be estimated in
one step with GMM. However, the firm exit decision is correlated with ξit in the step two equation.
This is the selection bias, which needs to be corrected. Olley and Pakes use a probit model to
estimate the conditional continuing probability Pit where the independent variables are 4th order
polynomial in jit−1, iit−1, kit−1. Then the step two estimation equation is given by
yit − αllit = αkkit + αjjit + g˜(φit−1 − α0 − αkkit−1 − αjjit−1, Pit) + νit + εit. (13)
In this equation, we use the estimated P̂it, φ̂it, and α̂it are obtained from step one. The above
equation can be estimated with NLLS, by using a polynomial to approximate g˜(·).
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) extends Olley-Pakes method by using intermediate inputs for a
proxy for the choice variable that is monotonic in unobserved productivity shocks.
Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2006) further assume that labor choice can be a dynamic decision.
Hence, step one does not identify αl. All parameters are identified in step two and step three.
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C Additional tables
Table 10: Probability of SOE being transformed to non-SOE or exit (Logit)
(1) (2)
VARIABLES SOE to non-SOE SOE exit
ωit−1 .198*** -.428***
(.034) (.020)
ωit−2 -.065 .060**
(.040) .028
ωit−3 .005 .179***
(.034) (.025)
lit−1 .165*** -.441***
(.058) (.036)
lit−2 -.024 .155***
(.065) (.047)
lit−3 -.058 .027
(.055) (.043)
kit−1 .305*** -.480***
(.075) (.091)
kit−2 -.128 .121
(.095) (.112)
kit−3 -.107 .265***
(.057) (.062)
Constant -4.381*** .348***
(.139) (.096)
Observations 15,369 32,656
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 11: Manufacturing Labor Productivity Growth Decomposition, 1998-2007
Within ownership Cross ownership Entry Exit
Year Total Growth Non-SOEs SOEs SOE→Non-SOE Non-SOE→SOE SOE Non-SOE SOE Non-SOE
1999 0.110 -0.026 -0.081 -0.003 0.003 0.052 0.165 0.000 0.000
2000 0.125 0.087 0.016 -0.004 0.002 0.031 0.158 0.062 0.103
2001 0.193 0.094 -0.041 -0.005 -0.001 0.043 0.298 0.067 0.129
2002 0.152 0.083 -0.043 -0.003 0.000 0.024 0.242 0.046 0.105
2003 0.179 0.064 -0.050 -0.005 -0.001 0.021 0.321 0.050 0.121
2004 0.237 0.565 0.056 0.013 0.005 0.001 0.011 0.108 0.306
2005 0.010 -0.752 -0.164 -0.020 -0.011 0.052 0.927 0.007 0.016
2006 0.150 -0.005 -0.024 -0.005 -0.001 0.012 0.271 0.021 0.078
2007 0.238 0.493 0.037 0.005 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.021 0.280
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Table 12: Labor productivity growth decomposition within ownership, 1998-2007
Non-SOEs SOEs
Year Within Between Cross Within Between Cross
1999 0.076 -0.034 -0.068 0.062 -0.107 -0.036
2000 0.071 0.077 -0.062 0.047 0.001 -0.031
2001 0.061 0.114 -0.082 0.061 -0.060 -0.042
2002 0.090 0.063 -0.070 0.042 -0.071 -0.014
2003 0.110 0.013 -0.059 0.031 -0.072 -0.010
2004 0.160 0.483 -0.078 0.036 0.031 -0.011
2005 0.058 -0.739 -0.071 0.012 -0.164 -0.011
2006 0.155 -0.094 -0.066 0.010 -0.029 -0.005
2007 0.179 0.348 -0.034 0.016 0.022 -0.002
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Figure 1: Ownership changes in China: from 2000 to 2007. In order from left to right for each year,
ownership type of the bars is SOEs, private-owned, limited liability, HMT & foreign (including
foreign firms and firms from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan), collectively-owned, and shareholding
corporations.
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Figure 2: Number of firms, SOEs and firm age: 1998 to 2007.
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Figure 3: Number and percentage of SOEs: 1998 to 2007.
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Figure 4: Number of SOEs and their survival rate: 1998 to 2007.
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Figure 5: Aggregate Capital and Investment in Chinese Manufacturing: 1998 to 2007.
37
35
40
45
50
55
Em
plo
ym
en
t (i
n m
illio
n)
5
10
15
20
25
Ou
tp
ut
 (in
 kil
o−
bill
ion
 RM
B)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
year
Output (left axis)
Employment (right axis)
Output is in the unit of kilo−billion RMB, and employment is of million workers
Output & Employment 1998−2007
Figure 6: Aggregate Output and Employment in Chinese Manufacturing: 1998 to 2007.
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Figure 7: TFP 1998-2007.
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Figure 8: Labor Productivity 1998-2007.
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Figure 9: Average industry concentration 1999-2007.
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Figure 10: Average industry concentration 1999-2007.
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Figure 11: Average tax sales ratio.
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Figure 12: Average debt-asset ratio.
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Figure 13: Average interest expediture asset ratio.
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Figure 14: TFP distribution
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Figure 15: Labor productivity distribution
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Figure 16: Firm size distribution: employee
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Figure 17: Firm size distribution: capital
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Figure 18: TFP distribution: All SOEs vs. Survived SOEs
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Figure 19: Labor productivity distribution: All SOEs vs. Survived SOEs
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Figure 20: Firm size distribution: employee: All SOEs vs. Survived SOEs
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Figure 21: Firm size distribution: capital: All SOEs vs. Survived SOEs
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Figure 22: SOE: before & after privatization
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